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Abstract 
 
 
Openness and Britain’s Productivity Performance, 1870-1990: A Sectoral Analysis 
 
This paper uses a new data set of comparative productivity levels on a sectoral basis to shed 
light on the links between openness and productivity performance in Britain between 1870 
and 1990. The key findings are: (1) As a result of the openness of the British economy, 
agriculture was unusually small in 19th century Britain, allowing resources to be deployed in 
the higher value added industrial and service sectors. This benefit of openness is rarely 
considered alongside the costs to British industry of retaining open markets when tariffs were 
being raised against British exports. (2) Many writers criticise the cosmopolitan service sector 
for neglecting domestic industry. However, this ignores the importance of the outward 
orientation of services for service sector productivity, and the growing importance of services 
for productivity performance overall. (3) The trend of British industrial performance was not 
improved by protection when it was applied in the 1930s, despite the claims of the tariff 
reformers. Furthermore, protective attempts to avoid de-industrialisation after World War II 
had an adverse effect on productivity performance in industry and in the aggregate economy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The historical literature contains two very different views of the links between openness and 
productivity performance in Britain since the late nineteenth century. For one group of 
writers, British prosperity has been founded on participation in the international economy 
(Imlah, 1958; Capie, 1983; 1994; Edelstein, 1982; Irwin, 1996). For others, however, the 
roots of British relative economic decline can be traced back to the continued adherence to 
liberal principles when other countries were abandoning them (Marrison, 1996; Kitson and 
Solomou, 1990). For this latter group, protectionism has been seen as a way of restructuring 
the economy onto a more favourable development path. Although there are now large 
literatures on tariff reform before 1914 and the adoption of the general tariff in the 1930s, few 
writers have attempted to link these issues to the debates over de-industrialisation and 
“globalisation” since the 1970s. This paper covers the full period from 1870 to 1990, 
adopting an explicit quantitative approach to facilitate comparisons between sub-periods. 
Particular attention is paid to the contribution of different sectors to Britain’s comparative 
productivity performance, since misleading conclusions can be drawn from a consideration of 
only part of the economy. 
 
Sections II and III set out the broad trends in productivity performance and the degree of 
openness of the British economy during the period 1870-1990. Although debates over 
protection often make reference to different sectors of the economy, most international 
comparisons of productivity work only in terms of aggregate productivity measures. Here, we 
draw on the recent estimates of Broadberry (1998) to examine the links between openness and 
productivity performance at the sectoral level. Although Britain was overtaken by the United 
States during the 1890s and by Germany during the 1960s, the sectoral patterns of changing 
productivity performance are very different from those emphasised in the conventional 
literature. In particular, we point to the importance of the later structural shift out of 
agriculture in the United States and Germany and to overtaking in services rather than in 
industry. In all three countries, trends in openness followed a U-shaped pattern with high 
levels of openness before World War I and after World War II, separated by a protectionist 
interlude. However, whereas the pre-World War I level of openness was surpassed by the 
1970s in Germany and by the early 1980s in the United States, this was much less clearly the 
case in Britain, even by the late 1980s. 
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Sections IV to VI consider shorter periods in the light of the long run evidence, paying 
particular attention to sectoral issues. In particular, we shall see that: (1) As a result of the 
openness of the British economy, agriculture was unusually small in 19th century Britain, 
allowing resources to be deployed in the higher value added industrial and service sectors. 
This benefit of openness is rarely considered alongside the costs to British industry of 
retaining open markets when tariffs were being raised against British exports. (2) Many 
writers criticise the cosmopolitan service sector for neglecting domestic industry. However, 
this ignores the importance of the outward orientation of services for service sector 
productivity, and the growing importance of services for productivity performance overall. (3) 
The trend of British industrial performance was not improved by protection when it was 
applied in the 1930s, despite the claims of the tariff reformers. Furthermore, protective 
attempts to avoid de-industrialisation after World War II had an adverse effect on productivity 
performance in industry and in the aggregate economy. 
 
II. BRITAIN’S LONG RUN PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
Table 1 presents sectoral estimates of comparative labour productivity levels for the US/UK 
and Germany/UK cases over the period 1870-1990, derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c). 
The United States and Germany were Britain’s main trading rivals during most of this period. 
The concept of labour productivity used here is output per person engaged. For the whole 
economy, labour productivity in the United States was about 90 per cent of the British level in 
1870, and the United States overtook Britain as the aggregate labour productivity leader 
during the 1890s and continued to forge ahead to the 1950s. Since then, there has been a slow 
process of British catching-up, but by 1990 there was still a substantial aggregate Anglo-
American labour productivity gap of more than 30 per cent. Turning to the Germany/UK 
comparison, for the whole economy, German labour productivity in 1871 was about 60 per 
cent of the British level, and had still reached only about 75 per cent of the British level by 
World War I.  After a setback across the war, Germany again reached about 75 per cent of the 
British level by the mid-1930s, rising to about 80 per cent by the late 1930s. After another 
setback across World War II, Germany continued to catch-up, overtook Britain only during 
the mid-1960s and by 1990 had a labour productivity advantage of about 25 per cent. 
 
The sectoral patterns of comparative productivity performance are quite varied. Here the nine-
sector analysis provided in Broadberry (1998) has been simplified onto a three-sector basis, 
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distinguishing between agriculture, industry and services. Industry includes mineral 
extraction, manufacturing, construction and the utilities, while services includes transport and 
communications, distribution, finance, professional and personal services and government. 
Both Germany and the United States caught-up with and overtook Britain in terms of 
aggregate labour productivity largely by shifting resources out of agriculture and improving 
their comparative productivity performance in services rather than by improving their 
comparative productivity performance in industry (Broadberry, 1998). 
 
Broadberry (1993) first established that comparative labour productivity in manufacturing has 
remained stationary in both the US/UK and the Germany/UK cases since the late nineteenth 
century, and Table 1 shows that this result generalises to industry as a whole. By contrast, in 
both cases the aggregate labour productivity ratio moves broadly in line with the labour 
productivity ratio for services. Although both Germany and the United States have improved 
their labour productivity performance relative to Britain in agriculture, there has also been a 
dramatic decline in the importance of agriculture, which can be seen in Table 2. Whereas in 
1870 agriculture accounted for about half of all employment in Germany and the United 
States, by 1990 this had fallen to under three-and-a-half per cent. The shift out of agriculture 
has nevertheless had an important impact on comparative productivity performance at the 
aggregate level. This is because in the late nineteenth century Britain already had a much 
smaller share of the labour force in agriculture, which has had a substantially lower value 
added per employee than in industry or services. Hence the large share of resources tied up in 
agriculture in the United States exercised a significant negative influence on the aggregate US 
productivity performance relative to Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, and as the importance of agriculture declined this negative influence was removed. 
Similarly, the relatively large share of resources in German agriculture had a negative effect 
on Germany’s aggregate productivity performance relative to Britain until after World War II. 
Note that Germany in 1950 had a bigger share of the labour force in agriculture than Britain 
in 1871.2 
 
                                                 
2 Conventional shift-share analysis fails to capture the importance of structural change because it is based on the 
assumption that the high rates of productivity growth in the shrinking agricultural sector would still have been 
achieved even if labour had not left the sector. See Broadberry (1998) for an alternative calculation. 
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The labour productivity differences in Table 1 may be explained in part by differences in 
capital intensity. So before we turn to measures of openness, it will be useful to provide 
estimates of comparative levels of total factor productivity (TFP), where TFP measures the 
productivity of labour and physical capital, weighted by their respective shares in income.3 
Comparing Table 3 with Table 1, we see that although capital explains a part of the labour 
productivity differences between the three countries, it is not sufficient to eliminate 
differences in TFP, some of which may be explained by openness.  
 
For the US/UK case, trends in comparative TFP and labour productivity at the aggregate level 
are similar, but with TFP differences generally smaller than labour productivity differences. 
One point worth noting here is that whereas the United States overtook Britain before World 
War I in terms of labour productivity, it was only between the wars that the United States 
gained a TFP advantage. This would be consistent with the emphasis of Abramovitz and 
David (1973; 1996) on the importance of capital rather than TFP in American economic 
growth during the nineteenth century. It is also consistent with McCloskey’s (1970) claim that 
Victorian Britain did not fail, in the sense that the United States was still catching-up in terms 
of aggregate TFP levels. In services, too, note that US overtaking of Britain also occurred 
later in terms of TFP than in terms of labour productivity. For the Germany/UK case, again 
comparing Tables 1 and 3 we see that trends are very similar for comparative TFP and labour 
productivity at the aggregate level, with differences in TFP generally smaller than differences 
in labour productivity. Note that in industry, Germany had caught up with Britain in terms of 
TFP as well as labour productivity before World War I. 
 
III.  TRENDS IN OPENNESS 
1.  International trade and protection 
The most commonly used measures of the degree of openness are the shares of imports and 
exports in GDP. Trade ratios can be calculated both for goods and for goods and services. For 
the United Kingdom, the figures in Table 4 show a period of increasing openness before 
World War I, while trade ratios declined during the period between the wars. The early post-
World War II period, although relatively open compared to the interwar period did not match 
                                                 
3The share of capital declines from 0.4 before World War I to 0.25 after World War II. These shares are derived 
from Matthews et al. (1982), Kendrick (1961) and Hoffmann (1965). 
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the degree of openness seen before World War I. Even by the late 1980s, the British export 
trade ratios had not regained their pre-1914 levels. 
 
Since we shall be concerned with Britain’s policies and performance in an international 
context, it will be helpful to consider the trade ratios in the United States and Germany, 
Britain’s main trading rivals over most of this period. In both Germany and the United States, 
trade ratios declined between the wars and rose again after World War II. In contrast to 
Britain, however, the pre-World War I degree of openness was decisively surpassed, by the 
1970s in the case of Germany and by the 1980s in the case of the United States. 
 
It is natural to link the U-shaped pattern of the trade ratios to changes in the level of 
protection. Figures on the ratio of duties to total imports are given in Table 5. Although this 
ratio gives an imperfect measure of changes in tariff rates, most writers find that it captures 
the broad movements (Capie, 1994: 31-32). For Britain, it is necessary to exclude revenue-
raising duties on tobacco and petroleum to obtain an accurate picture of the pattern of 
protection, particularly since World War II. The trend towards free trade in Britain during the 
nineteenth century is clearly visible, using both the total and adjusted customs revenue to 
import value ratios. The retreat from free trade in the interwar period is equally clear, 
culminating in the General Tariff of 1932. For the post-World War II period, however, it is 
important to remove the customs duties on tobacco and petroleum, which should not be seen 
as protective (Lindert, 1991). Then the return to openness is clear. 
 
For the United States, data are available on the ratio of duties to dutiable imports, as well as 
the ratio of duties to total imports. Although the former ratio is somewhat higher, the trend is 
very similar to that for the ratio of duties to total imports. A declining level of protection in 
the first half of the nineteenth century was sharply reversed during the Civil War decade, and 
although there was a further downward drift in the level during the period 1870-1913, 
protection remained high by international standards before World War I. The United States 
remained protectionist between the wars, with the Fordney-McCumber and Hawley-Smoot 
tariffs of 1922 and 1930, respectively, before becoming increasingly liberal under the GATT 
system during the post-World War II period. 
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German data on the ratio of customs duties to total imports are given in Table 5 for the period 
after the formation of the German Reich. Although there was a small increase during the 
1880s, the degree of protection was much closer to the British than to the American level. 
Alternative data on the unweighted average level of duties confirm that the scale of the retreat 
from free trade in Continental Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century should not be 
exaggerated (Liepmann, 1938). Thus, for example, Capie (1983: 26) reports an average ad 
valorem rate of duty of 8.4 per cent for Germany in 1910. The rise of protectionism in 
Germany between the wars, particularly with the growth of bilateralism under the Third 
Reich, is clearly visible in Table 5. Equally clear is the firm embrace of a liberal trading 
policy after World War II. Given the strong trading links with other European countries, 
European integration via the EEC has resulted in very low ratios of customs duties to imports 
in Germany. However, Weiss (1988) offers a qualification to this view, noting the growth of 
subsidies to a number of German industries, thus to some extent undermining the liberal 
regime (Giersch et al., 1992). 
 
2.  Trade blocs 
In this section we examine trends in British exports to see how Britain came to be 
increasingly dependent on Empire markets between the late nineteenth century and the mid-
twentieth century. The key factor was the growth of protectionism in the United States and 
Germany during the late nineteenth century, which before World War I culminated in a 
division of the world into spheres of influence by the three major manufacturing countries 
(Taussig, 1892; Schlote, 1952; Hoffman, 1933). A survey of many of the pre-1914 
international combines is given in Plummer (1951: 4-10). The chemical industry was one of 
the most prone to international combination, with formal agreements in alkalis and 
explosives. As Reader (1970: 60) puts it, "In deciding how to share markets, the principle 
generally followed in each group, was that the British member...... should have the markets of 
Great Britain and the British Empire; the European member or members, Europe. Markets 
elsewhere in the world were a matter for negotiation. The USA, the richest, stood alone by 
reason of the formidable nature of the natives. Latin America, where both British and 
European connections were strong, was apt to be looked upon by American companies, 
particularly in the explosives trade, as being covered by a businessman's version of the 
Monroe Doctrine......... For the purposes of market-sharing the Russian Empire was generally 
taken as a province of Europe and the Chinese as a dependency of the British." 
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The upshot of these trends was a clear move towards concentration by British producers on 
Empire markets from the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, as Schlote's (1952) data in 
Part A of Table 6 show, this was a new departure, since there was no clear upward trend in 
the Empire share of British exports between 1830 and 1870. The trend towards concentration 
on Empire markets, particularly the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of 
South Africa, Canada and Newfoundland, accelerated in the interwar period. The upheaval in 
the British trade data caused by the independence of the Irish Free State does not affect these 
trends, since the share can be calculated on both the old and the new basis in Parts A and B of 
Table 6. Continuing to the present in Part B of Table 6, the share of British exports to the 
original six members of the EEC as well as the share to “British countries” can be seen. 
Clearly the rise to dominance of Empire markets (peaking at 55% in 1951) was the other side 
of a serious decline in the importance of Continental European markets during the interwar 
and transwar periods. Imperial Preference was clearly no small sideshow for the British 
economy in the twentieth century. Indeed, as Drummond (1974: 426) notes, Imperial 
economic matters took up more Cabinet time than any other aspect of economic affairs 
between the wars. As late as 1970, more British exports were going to “British countries” 
than to the EEC. Since Britain joined the EEC in 1973, however, trade with “British 
countries” (including the Republic of South Africa and the Irish Republic) has dramatically 
declined in importance. 
 
IV.  FREE TRADE BRITAIN, 1870-1914 
Before 1914, Britain’s continued commitment to openness despite growing restrictions 
abroad had beneficial effects on aggregate productivity performance through the shift of 
resources out of low value added agriculture and high productivity in Britain’s cosmopolitan 
commercial and financial service sectors. These factors are rarely given sufficient weight in 
the literature on British growth, which focuses on the difficulties faced by British industry as 
a result of tariffs faced in foreign markets and dumping by foreign producers in the British 
market. This section will consider in turn the situation in industry, agriculture and services. 
 
1. Industry 
The disadvantage faced by British industry in foreign markets on the eve of World War I is 
easily demonstrated in Table 7. Part A shows ad valorem tariff rates on a number of British 
exports in 1903. The countries are listed in descending order of the degree of protection, as 
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measured by the weighted average tariff rate across 31 commodites, using British export 
weights. The average tariff faced by British industrial exporters ranged from 131 per cent in 
Russia to 3 percent in the Netherlands. Part B is taken from Grunzel’s (1916) study of tariffs 
on a multilateral basis in 1913, with tariffs presented in terms of German marks per hundred 
kilograms. An average of tariffs on this basis would not be meaningful, but it is clear from the 
ordering of countries for individual commodities that the averages in Part A, based on British 
export prices and values, do indeed broadly reflect the multilateral situation. The United 
States was clearly a country with very high industrial tariffs, Germany was moderately 
protective and Britain was a free trade country. Notice also from Part B that Germany had a 
high tariff on wheat, the key agricultural product, a theme that will be taken up in the next 
section. 
 
The link between openness and industrial productivity performance is ambiguous in theory. In 
a Schumpeterian framework, protection may provide a guarantee of profits which provides 
the incentive to invest in a risky undertaking, and learning effects may then lead to a shift of 
comparative advantage (Aghion and Howitt, 1998: chapter 11). On the other hand, however, 
tariffs may allow firms to reap what Hicks (1935: 8) viewed as the best of all monopoly 
profits, a quiet life. For Wilhelmine Germany, Webb (1980) argues that the restriction of 
competition by tariffs and cartels may have contributed to the productivity advance of 
German heavy industry by reducing the riskiness of capital intensive technologies. 
Nevertheless, in a wider sample of countries, Capie (1994: 40-42) is unable to find a positive 
relationship between the growth of industrial production and nominal tariff rates measured as 
the ratio of total duties to exports. 
 
Perhaps the most telling evidence against arguments that Britain was being disadvantaged 
industrially by remaining free trade while other countries adopted protective measures from 
the late nineteenth century is the pattern of comparative productivity levels in manufacturing. 
As Broadberry (1997a) shows, Britain was not falling behind in terms of manufacturing 
output per employee. Some countries nevertheless had faster growth of manufacturing output 
and exports as their population grew faster than in Britain, or as they industrialised. Labour 
productivity in Britain’s manufacturing industry kept pace with the rest of Europe and the 
transatlantic productivity gap in manufacturing remained stationary between 1870 and 1913. 
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Furthermore, Britain still had a larger share of the labour force in manufacturing in 1913 than 
any other country. 
 
2.  Agriculture 
Although the fact that free traders in nineteenth century Britain pointed to the benefit to 
consumers of cheap grain prices arising from free trade in corn has been widely noted, the 
implications for productivity in domestic agriculture have not really been spelled out (Imlah, 
1958: 145-146). In Britain, the main impact of the grain invasion from the New World was a 
shift of the product mix away from grain towards higher value-added pastoral products, 
coupled with higher capital intensity in what remained of the British arable farming sector (Ó 
Gráda, 1994: 149-156; Brown, 1987: 25-26, 33).  As a result, the high levels of labour 
productivity that already characterised British agriculture during the Industrial Revolution 
were raised still further, and the relatively small British agricultural sector continued to 
achieve labour productivity levels on a par with the United States before World War I.  The 
highest levels of labour productivity were recorded in the parts of the New World 
concentrating on pastoral products, especially Australia, New Zealand and Argentina (Rostas, 
1948: 80). In much of continental Europe, however, the response to the grain invasion from 
the New World was an intensification of agricultural protection from the 1870s to World War 
I (Bairoch, 1989: 51-69). With grain prices maintained artificially high by tariff barriers, low 
productivity continental farmers were able to remain in business. Given the weight of 
agriculture in overall economic activity at the time, this had important consequences for 
aggregate productivity performance which lasted well into the post-World War II period. 
 
As noted in Broadberry (1997c), Germany had caught up with Britain in all industrial sectors 
before World War I, but German aggregate labour productivity nevertheless remained at 
about three-quarters of the British level. This can be explained in part by low productivity in 
German services, but agriculture played a more important part since:  (1) the productivity gap 
was larger in agriculture than in services;  (2) agriculture accounted for a larger share of 
employment than services;  (3) value added per employee was lower in agriculture than in 
services. Although the United States also had a large share of the labour force in agriculture 
this was because of favourable land endowments that enabled farmers to produce at high 
levels of labour productivity, even without much capital. 
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3.  Services 
One of the outstanding features of the period between the mid-nineteenth century and World 
War I was the emergence of Britain as the centre of the world system of trade and payments. 
As a result, Britain’s cosmopolitan service sector generated between 20 and 25 per cent of 
total exports between 1870 and 1913, as can be seen in Table 4. The major service sectors 
generating exports were transport and communications (particularly shipping), distribution 
(particularly wholesale merchanting) and financial services (particularly insurance and 
merchant banking). Imlah (1958: 70-75) provides figures on the net credits generated by these 
three sectors, which made a substantial contribution to the current account of the balance of 
payments, fluctuating between about 7 and 9 per cent of GDP. For Germany, by contrast, the 
much smaller and less productive service sector generated a net surplus on the current account 
of 2 to 3 per cent of GDP.4 
 
The openness and cosmopolitanism of the British service sector has nevertheless been seen 
traditionally as a problem in much of the literature on British economic growth, which is 
heavily oriented towards manufacturing. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this view 
is the claim that domestic manufacturing industry was starved of capital as a result of 
cosmopolitan financiers based in the City of London directing British savings overseas 
(Kennedy, 1987; Best and Humphries, 1986). Whilst Collins (1990; 1998) provides many 
reasons to be sceptical of this view, we concentrate here on two points which have received 
insufficient attention in the literature. First, value added per employee was relatively high in 
financial services, so that Britain’s large and specialised financial service sector made a 
positive direct contribution to Britain’s overall productivity position. Second, however, as 
noted above, Britain was not in fact falling behind in terms of manufacturing labour 
productivity before World War I;  the long-standing transatlantic labour productivity gap in 
manufacturing was stationary between 1870 and 1913 and no other European country was 
substantially ahead of Britain by 1913 (Broadberry, 1997a: 52-57). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Figures from Hoffmann (1965: 817, 825-826) 
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V.  PROTECTION AND IMPERIAL PREFERENCE, 1914-1950 
Once again, the conventional analysis focuses on industry and neglects the implications for 
agriculture and services. Protectionism was accompanied by a policy of imperial preference, 
which had a significant impact on the geographical orientation of British business activity, in 
services as well as in industry. This was to create difficulties of adjustment when the world 
economy reintegrated after World War II. As for the pre-1914 period, it will be useful to 
consider industry, agriculture and services in turn. 
 
1.  Industry 
Kitson and Solomou (1990) accept the conventional view that protectionism was bad for the 
world economy as a whole between the wars, but make the more limited claim that the British 
adoption of a general tariff in 1932 was a second best policy given the extent of protectionism 
abroad. One issue concerns the impact of the tariff on the level of economic activity; a 
cyclical recovery would be expected to have had beneficial effects on productivity in the short 
run, since employment lagged behind output in the economic cycle.5 However, the more 
striking claim made by Kitson and Solomou (1990: 10-16) is that the tariff caused an increase 
in the trend rate of growth. An obvious difficulty with this argument can be seen in Table 8; 
growth of GDP was faster during the 1920s than during the 1930s.6 Even if attention is 
confined to industrial production, the acceleration of growth in the 1930s is surely insufficient 
to warrant claims of a change in trend. However, Kitson and Solomou (1990: 12) argue that 
the high growth of the 1920s was just a cyclical phenomenon bringing the economy back to 
the trend for the period 1899-1929. So although actual growth did not increase during the 
1930s relative to the 1920s, Kitson and Solomou nevertheless see an increase in trend growth 
during the 1930s relative to the trend for the longer period 1899-1929. This can be seen in 
Table 8 for compromise GDP as well as for industrial production. However, the argument is 
obviously highly dependent on the periodisation imposed on the data. If a break in trend is 
tested for rather than imposed, the Kitson and Solomou claim is easily rejected. For industrial 
                                                 
5 Although the direction of the effect is not in dispute, it is likely that Kitson and Solomou (1990) overstate its 
magnitude. Since the tariff was imposed after Britain left the gold standard, any improvement in the balance of 
trade brought about by the tariff may be expected to have caused exchange rate appreciation, offsetting the 
competitive gain from the tariff (Broadberry, 1986: 132-138). 
6 Kitson and Solomou (1990: 11) report figures for 1925-29 rather than the conventional peak-to-peak period 
1924-29; this has the effect of showing the growth rate of compromise GDP at 2.0 per cent per annum during 
both the 1920s and the 1930s. The explanation given for the unconventional choice of dates is that “1924 is far 
too close to the 1921 depression to be regarded as a peak year in economic activity.” (Kitson and Solomou, 
1990: 11).  
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production over the period 1879-1938, Greasley and Oxley (1996) find a break in trend at 
1920 and crashes at 1914 and 1920, but reject a break in trend at 1929. For GDP, Mills 
(1991) finds a major regime shift only after the deep recession of 1921.  
Kitson and Solomou (1990) stop their analysis at the end of the 1930s. However, there is a 
literature which relates the problems of British industrial productivity in the early post-World 
War II period to the weakening of competitive pressures during the 1930s (Broadberry and 
Crafts, 1990; 1992; 1996). Since the tariff formed a part of this anti-competitive environment, 
it may be seen as contributing to Britain’s postwar industrial productivity problems. The same 
may be said of the policy of imperial preference. We have already seen in Table 6 that by the 
end of World War II more than half of Britain’s exports were going to Empire markets, and 
for some industries the Empire share of Britain’s exports was more than three-quarters.7 This 
may be seen as helping to maintain the level of economic activity in the short run, but 
creating problems of adjustment in the long run. 
 
The trans-World War II period saw an increase in the share of the labour force employed in 
agriculture and industry, which went against the trend since the mid-nineteenth century. 
Within the context of a controlled economy, capital as well as labour inputs were directed 
into manufacturing, mining and agriculture on strategic grounds. Yet, as Matthews et al. 
(1982: 235-236) point out, the increase in total factor input growth was offset by a decrease in 
TFP growth, suggesting a tendency to diminishing returns.  
 
2.  Agriculture 
It is worth noting that the strategic justification for protecting agriculture in peacetime so as to 
secure food supplies during war did not prove to be of much value during the twentieth 
century. As Olson (1963: 138-140) notes, it was Germany rather than Britain that succumbed 
to blockade during World War I. Olson (1963: 138-139) points to the ability of the British 
agricultural sector to expand output on the stored-up fertility of grasslands brought back into 
arable use compared with the inability of German agriculture to maintain output at full stretch 
in the face of wartime disruption. However, Olson (1963: 146) also stresses the flexibility of 
the British service sector through administration as well as distribution as the decisive factor. 
 
                                                 
7 In 1948, this was the case for fertilisers, cotton cloth, hosiery, carpets, tobacco and glass. 
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One factor behind the increase of arable output in Britain during World War I was a system of 
guaranteed minimum prices set under the Corn Production Act of 1917. If market prices fell 
below the minimum for the following six years, farmers were to receive deficiency payments 
equal to the difference between the market and minimum prices on the volume of output that 
they produced (Whetham, 1978: 94-95). The system was extended for an indefinite term in 
the Agriculture Act of 1920, but when agricultural prices suddenly collapsed the legislation 
was hastily repealed in 1921 in what became known in farming circles as the “Great Betrayal” 
(Whetham, 1978: 139-141). Apart from a system of beet sugar subsidies introduced in 1924, 
there were few measures to protect agriculture during the 1920s, which continued to be a 
difficult time for British farmers, particularly arable producers. During the 1930s, however, a 
wider range of protective measures was introduced as prices collapsed still further. Although 
tariffs and quotas were used in some cases, support for agriculture generally took the form of 
subsidies and marketing schemes. This was partly as a result of government desires to keep 
food prices low, but it also reflected the policy of imperial preference. If Britain was to obtain 
access to Empire markets for industrial exports, then Empire farmers had to have access to 
the British market for agricultural produce. Hence Brown (1987: 118) sees protection as a 
great disappointment to British farmers.  
 
As during World War I, Britain was able to survive blockade by Germany during World War 
II (Olson, 1963: 140). During the later 1930s, as the prospect of war approached, the 
government made preparations for the expansion of agricultural output, and this was achieved 
much more rapidly during World War II than during World War I (Brown, 1987: 125-146). 
Again, it was the possibility of expansion on the grasslands combined with the flexibility of 
the British service sector that proved decisive (Olson, 1963: 146). 
 
3.  Services 
Most accounts of inter-war British economic history emphasise the detrimental effects of the 
return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity in 1925. The openness and outward 
orientation of the financial services sector is usually seen as the driving force behind this 
decision, while industry is seen as bearing the costs of the overvalued exchange rate that 
resulted. The costs of the overvalued exchange rate have been the subject of much debate, 
with a number of studies attempting a quantitative evaluation (Moggridge, 1972; Broadberry, 
1986). However, the benefits for productivity of an outward oriented service sector are not 
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usually considered in such studies, which gives the literature a bias towards industry. 
However, as we have seen in Table 1, it is the loss of productivity leadership in services that 
mirrors most closely Britain’s overall loss of productivity leadership.  
One way in which Britain’s service sector became less globalised during the inter-war period 
was through the growing importance of links with the Empire, since the strategy of imperial 
integration affected services as well as industry. In Table 9, for example, we see that whilst 
British ships continued to carry almost all seaborne trade on inter-Imperial routes, Britain’s 
share declined substantially on Empire-foreign routes and precipitously on foreign-foreign 
routes.  
 
VI.  BRITAIN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1950-1990 
Protection for industry and agriculture continued after World War II, although at a lower level 
than during the 1930s. The proportion of the labour force in manufacturing continued to rise 
until 1960, as post-war governments sought to encourage exports and avoid balance of 
payments problems while maintaining a fixed exchange rate (Matthews et al., 1982: 221). 
Many restrictions on openness, including quotas, tariffs and exchange controls, were needed 
to maintain external equilibrium with the over-expanded agricultural and industrial sectors 
(Foreman-Peck, 1991).  
 
As the world economy reintegrated on a liberal basis, particularly from about 1960, British 
industry faced major problems of adjustment. As well as an inevitable reduction in the share 
of the labour force devoted to industry, there were adjustment costs in switching from 
Commonwealth to European markets. However, the process of adjustment has had benefits as 
well as costs. As productivity growth in manufacturing accelerated during the 1980s, and as 
output and employment expanded rapidly in services, the long period of British relative 
economic decline came to an end. Furthermore, as the European economy became more 
integrated, economies of scale and standardisation helped to reduce the transatlantic 
productivity gaps in industry and services. Although agricultural protection has remained high 
under the Common Agricultural Policy, with adverse consequences for food prices, 
agriculture is now too small a part of the economy for this to have a major impact on 
productivity in the economy as a whole. 
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1.  Industry 
Matthews et al. (1982: 235-236) point to the slowing down of TFP growth despite the 
increase in the growth of total factor input during the trans-World War II period as evidence 
of diminishing returns in manufacturing. Similarly, in mineral extraction, TFP growth became 
negative as the movement of total factor input out of the sector slowed down. It is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that during the early post-war period the over-extended manufacturing and 
mineral extraction sectors required protection. In the coal industry, import licences were 
granted only to the state-owned National Coal Board for use at times when home production 
fell short of demand (Ashworth, 1986: 47). In addition, the coal industry received substantial 
financial support while its major customers, the electricity supply and gas industries, were 
required to burn more coal than warranted by purely economic considerations (Buxton, 1978: 
239). In manufacturing, the early post-war period was characterised by the widespread use of 
import quotas, while the rationing of key inputs such as steel helped to direct resources 
towards export industries (Foreman-Peck, 1991: 159-160; Dow, 1965: 153-162). As controls 
were removed in line with a return to a more liberal world trading environment, the British 
economy continually ran into balance of payments problems. In 1964 the incoming Labour 
government imposed a surcharge on manufactured imports in an ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to avoid devaluation (Foreman-Peck, 1991: 161). They also imposed a selective 
employment tax (SET) to encourage labour into industrial rather than service sector 
employment (Cairncross, 1992: 158-159). 
 
British industry faced additional difficulties during the early post-war period arising from the 
legacy of imperial preference policies adopted between the wars. Just when investment in 
marketing and after-sales service was becoming more important, British industry found itself 
oriented towards distant markets in which Britain had secured a strong position only through 
preferential treatment. Sometimes, the preferential treatment was rapidly withdrawn after 
World War II. In the motor vehicle industry, for example, high tariffs in Australia effectively 
closed off Britain’s most important inter-war market, while exchange controls made it 
difficult to invest in adequate marketing and after-sales service in Continental Europe 
(Whisler, 1994: 5). Since spare parts were not included in export quotas, serious damage was 
done to the reputation of British cars in this important market (Dunnett, 1980: 37). In Table 6 
we see that during the 1960s there was a dramatic decline in the share of British exports going 
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to Commonwealth markets, which were overtaken in importance by the EEC during the 
1970s. 
 
The decision to join the EEC in 1973 accelerated the process of increasing openness. 
However, as the process of de-industrialisation also threatened to accelerate during the 1970s, 
governments continued to protect industry through industrial policies that effectively 
subsidised “lame ducks” (Millward, 1994: 163-165). This policy changed under the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s, with dramatic effects on both the size of the 
industrial sector and its productivity performance. As employment in manufacturing shrank 
by about 2 million between 1979 and 1989, labour productivity growth accelerated to 4.2 per 
cent per annum after stagnating at 0.7 per cent per annum during the previous cycle, 1973-
1979 (Broadberry, 2000). Table 10 shows the dramatic turn-round of British productivity 
performance relative to Germany in a number of industries. The productivity figures here, 
taken from O’Mahony and Wagner (1994) refer to value added per hour worked. In motor 
vehicles, for example, the German productivity advantage reached nearly two-to-one in 1979, 
but had fallen back to less than 25 per cent by 1989, while in aerospace, the productivity gap 
had been all but eliminated by 1989 despite having risen above two-to-one in 1979. In iron 
and steel the turn-round was even more dramatic, with a German productivity advantage of 
more than two-and-a-half-to-one in 1979 being turned into a British advantage by 1989.  
 
Kitson and Michie (1996) argue that the de-industrialisation that accompanied this 
productivity turn-round has had serious consequences, resulting in a balance of payments 
constraint on growth. But as Crafts (1996: 17) notes, “the idea of a balance of payments 
constraint on growth is often over-played or deployed to promote damaging supply-side 
policies.” If we accept that the British industrial sector was over-expanded during World War 
II and could be maintained at an artificially high level only by limiting the openness of the 
British economy in some way, then the de-industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s appears 
much less damaging. 
 
2.  Agriculture 
Whereas the encouragement of agricultural production during World War I was followed by 
the virtual elimination of support during the “Great Betrayal” of 1921, World War II was 
followed by the reinforcement of support in the 1947 Agriculture Act (Holderness, 1985: 12-
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13). However, the British system of agricultural protection did not involve the sacrifice of low 
food prices for consumers. Building on the pre-war schemes, farmers received deficiency 
payments when market prices fell below guaranteed prices. This was less damaging than the 
variable levy system, which raises the price to consumers as well as producers (El-Agraa, 
1994: 212-214). However, Britain adopted the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC in 
1973, based upon the variable levy system. The scale of support for agriculture during the 
1970s and 1980s was considerable, and this can be seen in the return of Britain to self-
sufficiency in many agricultural products. Even in wheat, where imports accounted for 77 
percent of consumption in 1936-39, imports had fallen to 23 per cent of consumption by 
1980-81 (Holderness, 1985: 174). Nevertheless, agriculture is now such a small part of the 
economy that its impact on the overall level of productivity is relatively insignificant. 
 
3.  Services 
As during the inter-war period, the outward orientation of the financial service sector has 
often been seen as a disadvantage during the post-war period. Pollard (1984: 85-88) argues 
that during the Bretton Woods era, the desire to retain an international role for sterling led to 
an overvalued exchange rate, which undermined the competitiveness of British industry. This 
echoes his views on the inter-war period, where he emphasises the costs to industry of the 
return to gold in 1925 at pre-war parity, but ignores the importance of high productivity in 
services for Britain’s overall productivity performance. In fact, international financial services 
is one of the few sectors where Britain has retained a strong competitive position (Smith, 
1992). In many other parts of the service sector Britain’s performance has been 
undistinguished, and it is the deterioration of comparative productivity performance in 
services that accounts for much of Britain’s relative economic decline overall. Since large 
parts of the service sector have been relatively closed to international competition, it is likely 
that contrary to the Pollard view, it is the sheltered nature of much of the service sector rather 
than the openness of international financial services that has been damaging for overall 
productivity performance. 
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VII.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper provides a quantitative economic analysis of the links between openness and 
productivity performance in Britain between 1870 and 1990, paying particular attention to 
sectoral issues and focusing on three sub-periods. (1)  Before 1914, Britain’s continued 
commitment to openness despite growing restrictions abroad had beneficial effects on 
aggregate productivity performance through the shift of resources out of low value added 
agriculture and high productivity in Britain’s cosmopolitan commercial and financial service 
sectors. These factors are rarely given sufficient weight in the literature on British growth, 
which focuses on the difficulties faced by British industry as a result of tariffs faced in foreign 
markets and dumping by foreign producers in the British market. (2) Between the wars, given 
the drift into autarky in much of the world, the policies of protection and imperial preference 
can be seen as raising the level of domestic activity, with beneficial cyclical effects on 
industrial productivity in the short run. However, claims of a shift in the trend rate of growth 
cannot be sustained. As for the pre-World War I period, conventional analysis concentrates 
on industry and neglects the implications of the trade regime for agriculture and services. (3) 
Within the controlled wartime British economy, industry and agriculture were expanded on 
strategic grounds, and the expansion continued during the early post-war period for balance of 
payments reasons. As the world economy reintegrated on a liberal basis, however, some de-
industrialisation was inevitable. The adjustment problems of industry were compounded by a 
need to switch from Commonwealth to European markets. However, the process of 
adjustment, which accelerated with the increased openness of the 1980s, has had benefits as 
well as costs. Dramatic improvements in Britain’s industrial productivity performance and 
rapid expansion of output as well as employment in services have brought the long period of 
British relative economic decline to an end. 
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TABLE 1: Comparative US/UK and Germany/UK labour productivity levels by sector, 
1869/71 to 1990 (UK=100) 
 
A. US/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1869/71 86.9 153.6 85.8 89.8 
1889/91 102.1 164.5 84.2 94.1 
1909/11 103.2 193.5 107.3 117.7 
1919/20 128.0 198.2 119.0 133.3 
1929 109.7 222.9 121.2 139.4 
1937 103.3 190.6 120.0 132.6 
1950 126.0 243.9 140.8 166.9 
1973 131.2 215.1 137.3 152.3 
1990 151.1 163.0 129.6 133.0 
 
 
B. Germany/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1871 55.7 86.2 66.1 59.5 
1891 53.7 92.5 71.9 60.5 
1911 67.3 122.0 81.3 75.5 
1925 53.8 97.4 78.2 69.0 
1929 56.9 101.7 84.3 74.1 
1935 57.2 99.1 85.7 75.7 
1950 41.2 95.8 83.1 74.4 
1973 50.8 128.9 111.0 114.0 
1990 75.4 116.7 130.3 125.4 
 
Sources: Derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c). 
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TABLE 2: Sectoral shares of employment in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, 1870-1990 (%) 
 
A. United States 
 Agriculture Industry Services
1870 50.0 24.8 25.2
1910 32.0 31.8 36.2
1920 26.2 33.2 40.6
1930 20.9 30.2 48.9
1940 17.9 31.6 50.5
1950 11.0 32.9 56.1
1973 3.7 28.9 67.4
1990 2.5 21.8 75.7
 
 
B. United Kingdom 
 Agriculture Industry Services
1871 22.2 42.4 35.4
1911 11.8 44.1 44.1
1924 8.6 46.5 44.9
1930 7.6 43.7 48.7
1937 6.2 44.5 49.3
1950 5.1 46.5 48.4
1973 2.9 41.8 55.3
1990 2.0 28.5 69.5
 
 
C. Germany 
 Agriculture Industry Services
1871 49.5 29.1 21.4
1913 34.5 37.9 27.6
1925 31.5 40.1 28.4
1930 30.5 37.4 32.1
1935 29.9 38.2 31.9
1950 24.3 42.1 33.6
1973 7.2 47.3 45.5
1990 3.4 39.7 56.9
 
Source: Derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c; 1998). 
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TABLE 3: Comparative US/UK and Germany/UK total factor productivity levels by 
sector, 1869/71 to 1990 (UK=100) 
 
A. US/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1869/71 98.4 153.8 86.3 95.1 
1889/91 122.9 139.7 64.3 83.3 
1909/11 117.8 151.1 71.7 90.5 
1919/20 132.4 158.4 92.2 108.2 
1929 117.6 187.8 92.0 112.7 
1937 118.8 161.1 89.1 105.9 
1950 132.5 218.0 110.2 138.1 
1973 127.2 202.4 120.6 137.5 
1990 142.0 157.5 119.9 125.5 
 
 
B. Germany/UK 
 Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate 
economy 
1871 58.3 86.0 69.7 61.6 
1891 59.8 86.1 71.9 63.2 
1911 71.4 102.6 83.2 75.3 
1925 57.1 98.0 85.5 74.3 
1929 59.4 100.5 92.2 78.5 
1935 59.7 97.1 89.6 78.3 
1950 44.6 93.3 89.2 76.2 
1973 48.1 112.4 118.0 108.2 
1990 65.4 103.5 134.3 116.1 
 
 
Sources: Derived from Broadberry (1997b; 1997c). 
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TABLE 4: Trade ratios, 1870-1990 (% of GDP) 
 
A. United Kingdom 
 Imports  Exports 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
Goods Goods & 
services
1870 24.9 27.1 22.0 29.1
1890 26.6 28.8 22.9 29.8
1913 28.6 30.9 25.3 32.4
1925 26.0 29.2 20.3 24.9
1929 23.6 26.8 18.1 23.2
1938 15.2 18.0 10.1 13.6
1950 17.9 23.8 17.5 23.2
1970 15.7 21.4 15.7 22.2
1989 22.6 27.7 17.9 23.5
 
 
B. United States 
 Imports  Exports 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
Goods Goods & 
services
1870 5.7 6.2 5.6 6.6
1890 6.5 7.2 6.9 7.2
1913 4.6 5.6 6.6 6.8
1925 4.6 5.4 5.4 5.8
1929 4.4 5.4 5.1 5.7
1938 2.6 3.3 3.8 4.5
1950 3.2 4.0 3.6 4.3
1970 4.0 5.5 4.4 5.6
1988 9.2 11.3 6.6 9.1
 
 
C. Germany 
 Imports  Exports 
 Goods Goods & 
services 
Goods Goods & 
services
1880 16.6  17.3
1890 17.5  14.1
1913 20.5  19.3
1925 18.5  13.8
1929 16.9  17.0
1938 5.6  5.4
1950 11.7 12.7 11.9 15.1
1970 15.0 20.5 18.2 22.6
1988 21.2 28.6 27.4 35.0
 
Sources: United Kingdom: Feinstein (1972: Tables 3 and 15); Economic Trends Annual 
Supplement, 1994, Tables 1.3 and 1.17; United States: 1870-1929: Trade data from US 
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Department of Commerce (1975), Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Time to 
1970, series U2-U4 and U9-U11; GDP from Kendrick (1961) and Balke and Gordon (1989); 
1929-88: Trade and GDP data from US Department of Commerce (1993), National Income 
and Product Accounts of the United States, Vol.1, 1929-58, Vol 2. 1959-88, Tables 1.1 and 
4.1; Germany: 1880-1950: Hoffmann (1965), Tables 125, 127, 248.; 1950-1988: Statistisches 
Bundesamt (1991), Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Revidierte Ergebnesse 1950 bis 
1990, Fachserie 18, Reihe S.15, Tables 2.2.1, 2.2.12 and 2.2.13. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Customs revenue as a share of import values in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Germany, 1820-1989 (%) 
 
 United Kingdom 
 
 United States 
 
Germany 
 Total Excl. 
tobacco 
& petrol 
Total Dutiable 
imports
Total 
1820 24.0   
1830 34.3  57.3 61.7  
1840 25.4 21.9 17.6 34.4  
1850 21.7 17.6 24.5 27.1  
1860 11.6 9.1 15.7 19.7  
1870 7.1 5.0 44.9 47.1  
1880 4.7 2.7 29.1 43.5 5.8 
1890 4.8 2.7 29.6 44.6 8.8 
1900 4.6 2.6 27.6 49.5 8.1 
1910 4.5 2.2 21.1 41.6 7.4 
1913 4.4 2.1 17.7 40.1 6.3 
1920 7.7 4.7 6.4 16.4  
1929 9.7 4.4 13.5 40.1 8.2 
1935 24.5 10.2 17.5 42.9 30.1 
1938 24.1 10.4 15.5 39.3 33.4 
1940 22.7  12.5 35.6  
1945 38.2  9.3 28.2  
1950 31.2 2.9 6.0 13.1 5.4 
1960 30.2 3.9 7.4 12.2 6.5 
1970 3.1 6.5 10.0 2.6 
1980 2.0 3.1 5.7 1.3 
1989 1.4 3.4 5.2 1.3 
 
Sources: Britain: Total customs revenue from Mitchell (1988: 581-586); Total import values 
from Mitchell (1988: 451-454); Customs revenue from tobacco and petrol from Statistical 
Abstract of the United Kingdom, Annual Abstract of Statistics, and National Income and 
Expenditure. Imports of tobacco and petrol from Mitchell (1988: 474-480). 
United States: US Department of Commerce (1975); Statistical Abstract of the United States.  
Germany: Customs duties and imports from Mitchell (1980) to 1975, updated from 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
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TABLE 6: British export markets, 1830-1990 
 
A. British Empire share of British exports of home products 
 % 
1830 26.1 
1840 32.3 
1850 27.2 
1860 32.1 
1870 26.0 
1880 33.7 
1890 33.1 
1900 32.4 
1913 37.2 
1925 39.6 
1929 41.5 
1931 38.8 
1932 41.1 
1933 41.2 
1934 44.0 
 
 
B. Shares of British exports to “British Countries” and EEC6 (%) 
 British 
Countries 
EEC6
1907 32.2 24.8
1912 36.0 22.7
1924 42.1 18.7
1930 43.5 18.3
1935 48.0 14.7
1948 52.7 9.8
1951 55.0 10.4
1954 53.0 13.0
1958 49.3 13.1
1963 37.5 20.3
1968 31.2 19.3
1970 25.1 21.7
1980 20.1 34.6
1990 16.7 41.3
 
Sources: Part A: Schlote (1952: Table 22); Part B: HM Customs and Excise (various issues), 
Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, London: HMSO. 
Notes: Part A: Old area of trade statistics after 1925 (i.e. United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland); Part B: “British Countries” includes the Irish Free State/Republic and the 
Republic of South Africa, as well as the Commonwealth. 
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TABLE 7: Tariff rates on the eve of World War I 
 
A. Ad valorem tariff rates on Britain’s exports in 1903 (%) 
 Average 
of 31 
goods 
Cotton 
yarn 
grey
Cotton 
fabric un-
bleached
Cotton 
fabric 
printed
Pig 
iron
Tin 
plate 
Leather 
shoes
Caustic 
soda
Russia 131 70 207 246 91 110 171 101
Spain 76 62 145 124 25 58 119 16
United States 73 48 72 88 26 50 25 36
Austria-Hungary 35 14 54 65 20 59 11 31
France 34 14 49 51 19 35 22 27
Italy 27 14 34 52 13 47 14 8
Germany 25 9 43 49 16 18 11 21
Sweden 23 9 30 50 free free 38 free
Denmark 18 7 15 60 free 17 25 free
Belgium 13 6 28 27 3 free 10 free
Norway 12 6 12 50 free free 33 free
Japan 9 7 7 11 4 9 20 11
Switzerland 7 3 4 13 1 9 5 1
Netherlands 3 free 5 5 free free 5 free
 
 
B. Multilateral tariffs in 1913, selected commodities (German marks per hundred 
kilograms) 
 Wheat Cotton 
yarn
Cotton 
fabric un-
bleached
Cotton 
fabric 
printed
Laces Bar 
iron 
Sheet 
iron 
Sewing 
needles
Russia free 108.13 1,161.00 1,404.0 2,539.0 9.89 13.85 641.20
Spain 6.50 140.00 352.35 299.70 1,093.5 5.18 6.48 243.00
United States 3.95 67.20 51.87 103.74 45% 2.78 5.56 25%
Austria-Hungary 5.35 28.05 -- 121.55 561.00 4.25 8.50 144.50
France 5.66 14.99 86.67 152.28 405.00 6.07 10.93 205.50
Italy 6.08 26.73 63.18 129.68 405.00 4.86 9.72 64.80
Germany 5.50 18.00 70.00 120.00 350.00 1.00 4.50 100.00
Sweden 4.16 22.50 56.25 123.75 450.00 free 4.50 45.00
Denmark free 7.04 56.80 151.68 227.50 1.17 1.17 75.00
Belgium free 12.15 64.80 81.00 15% 0.81 0.81 13%
Norway 4.86 13.50 28.13 123.75 674.50 free free 84.38
Japan 2.68 22.28 62.70 87.14 69.60 2.09 2.61 175.89
Switzerland 0.24 16.20 8.10 48.60 81.00 0.24 0.49 40.50
Netherlands free free 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Great Britain free free free free free free free free
 
 
Sources: Part A: Board of Trade (1904: 292-315); Part B: Grunzel (1916: 155-158). 
Notes: Part A: Average calculated using British export weights; Part B: Percentage values 
refer to ad valorem rates. 
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TABLE 8: UK growth rates, 1899-1937 (% per annum) 
 
 Compromise 
GDP 
Industrial 
production
1899-1929 1.00 1.54
1924-1929 2.57 2.93
1929-1937 1.96 3.28
 
Source: Derived from Feinstein (1972, Tables 6 and 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: Shares of seaborne trade carried in British ships, 1912-1936 (%) 
 
 1912 1931 1936
Inter-Imperial 95.6 94.4 93.2
Empire-Foreign 60.8 52.6 47.2
Foreign-Foreign 22.1 12.8 12.2
Total 47.6 39.3 39.4
 
Source: Leak (1939: 252). 
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TABLE 10: Comparative Germany/UK labour productivity levels in manufacturing 
(UK=100) 
 
 1973 1979 1989 
Chemicals 103.3 127.6 102.5 
Mineral oil refining 88.2 122.5 107.7 
Plastic products 117.3 126.4 109.7 
Rubber products 124.5 140.3 103.5 
Mineral products 84.1 106.4 90.9 
Ceramic goods 131.5 130.6 125.2 
Glass 99.9 129.5 117.7 
Iron and steel 124.8 263.4 88.9 
Non-ferrous metals 80.5 119.9 112.7 
Plant and steelwork 123.7 125.0 124.9 
Mechanical engineering 125.9 141.9 123.7 
Office machinery 100.7 107.6 86.6 
Motor vehicles 148.5 186.0 123.7 
Shipbuilding 144.6 143.7 105.3 
Aerospace 131.2 200.4 100.9 
Electrical engineering 83.5 101.9 97.6 
Instrument engineering 180.5 171.6 143.6 
Finished metal products 130.0 132.1 127.1 
Toys, sport & musical instruments 115.4 131.8 130.4 
Timber and board 95.3 110.9 105.1 
Wood products 176.4 178.4 150.1 
Paper and board 147.9 215.1 160.2 
Paper products 164.9 174.4 169.1 
Printing and publishing 158.5 189.3 145.3 
Leather and footwear 93.3 84.9 104.8 
Textiles 88.3 110.8 100.6 
Clothing 133.5 123.5 124.2 
Food 101.5 125.3 112.9 
Drink 59.3 59.3 83.0 
Tobacco 42.1 68.7 59.5 
Total manufacturing 119.4 140.0 116.5 
 
Source: O’Mahony and Wagner (1994: 7). 
Note: Labour productivity measured as value added per hour worked. 
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